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ABSTRACT 
 
Electronic commerce applications started with EFT 
(Electronic Fund Transfers) for large corporations, financial 
institutions, and a few small businesses in the early 1970s.  
Then, the development of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) 
that expanded from financial system added this application 
to manufactures, retailers and services.  In the early 1990s, 
the commercialization of the Internet had generated a 
number of potential Internet users rapidly.  By 2008, the 
number of the Internet user is predicted to reach 750 million 
globally according to Forrest Research Institute in 1996.  
Among of all Internet users, approximately 50% of them are 
predicted to be on line shoppers in banking, investment and 
retailing services.  As a result, it is reasonable to assume 
that the greater the level of the Internet usage, the higher is 
the risk of money laundering.   
 
PREAMBLE 
 
To disguise or conceal large illegally obtained gains 
generated from crime is a physical effort spent since 
criminal activities exist in the country.  Legitimate is an 
incentive to money laundering for organised crime, for 
example drug trafficking, and acts such as smuggling, illicit 
weapon sales, embezzlement, ransom, and even computer 
fraud schemes.  The activity of money laundering is usually 
a cross boarder issue that involves bank secrecy to protect 
financial records, government’s attitude to counter money 
laundering, whether or not SWIFT member, and corruption.  
Any of those indicators would determine the extent of two 
basic elements of conducting money laundering: 
convenience and less-attention from law enforcement 
authority, which are various from one jurisdiction to another.   
 
By nature, money laundering occurs in black market where 
is not inside of normal economic activity and statistics. [1]  
A large scale of money laundering would produce the 
adverse macro-economic effects on changes in money 
demand; interest rate and exchange rate volatility; tax 
collection and fiscal policy.  For the private sector, money 
laundering may reduce the cost of capital for illegal 
organization and provide a competitive advantage over legal 
business entity.  For the banking sector, money launderers 
commonly use financial institutions as intermediaries to 
process funds derived from criminal activities.  If these 
illicit funds can be easily processed through a particular 
bank that may be unwittingly used or not, risks to bank asset 
quality [2] would be heightened.  From social and political 
point of view, if anti-money laundering system is ineffective, 
organised crime may infiltrate financial institutions and 
control ma jor sector of economy by investment.  These 
organised criminal activities may cause social ethical 
standards distorted and government democratic transition 
obstructed. 
 
Thus, in respond to national and inter-national money 
laundering concern, in 1989, G7 established the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) in Paris to coordinate money 
laundering issues.  FATF developed Forty 
Recommendations that set out measures for member 
countries to implement anti-money laundering policy. [3]  
Many non-FATF member countries have recognized Forty 
Recommendations as international standard for anti-money 
laundering and initiate their own countermeasures. [4] 
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As international co-operation in anti-money laundering 
grows substantially, however, money launderers keep 
looking for new more sophisticated money laundering routes 
to avoid investigation from law enforcement agencies.  In 
past years, the rapid explosion of the Internet may provide 
money launderers access to and from a foreign bank in any 
jurisdiction where has less stringent anti-money laundering 
law and help hide their identity in network laundering 
process.  Conventionally, legitimizing illegal profits is 
usually limited to physical cash purchase of real property 
and personal valuables, or scurry of cash deposit into 
account through financial system with direct or indirect 
contact.  At present, the arrival of electronic payment with 
security and privacy through computer network may attract 
money launderers.  Despite no available concrete indicators 
for such use by money launderers and various trends for 
Internet-based laundering geographically, the potential 
negative impact cannot be neglected by legislative 
authorities, law enforcement agencies, and banking 
supervisors.   
 
This paper attempts to illustrate classic and Internet-based 
money laundering schemes and will explore potential 
loopholes that occur on web-based laundering.   This paper 
also reviews counter money laundering initiatives and issues 
for money laundering through the Internet.  Finally, the 
framework of anti-money laundering through the Internet 
will be addressed so that the law enforcement authorities, 
national legislators, and international organizations may 
achieve agreement on seeking for appropriate amendments 
to countermeasures against Internet-based laundering. 
CLASSIC APPROACH FOR MONEY LAUNDERING 
Money laundering is the approach of hiding the illicit source 
or illicit application of income, and then transforming that 
income to be legitimate. [5]  Conventionally, physical cash 
payment is the most popular means of money laundering.  
The key point of laundering process is to avoid unwanted 
attention from legal enforcement agencies.  In that respect, 
it consists of three basic phases. [6]  
 In the beginning placement phase, the launderers deposit their 
illegal activity proceeds into the financial system.  In order 
to avoid detection, the large sum of tainted proceeds might be 
divided into less conspicuous smaller amounts that fall 
beneath bank regulatory reporting limit [7] and then 
deposited into bank accounts or subscribed a series of 
financial instruments under disguised beneficiary.  However, 
the structure of this initial stage is usually fragile and easily 
leaves traceable records.  Thus, the laundering process will 
deepen into the second phase: layering.   
When entering layering phase, the launderers might try to 
generate indistinct existence of illegal profits by a series of 
complicated bank transactions or movements of the funds to 
be distant from illegal origin.  The layering approach might 
be continuous purchases and sells of financial instruments 
and directly wire laundered proceeds into foreign banks in 
jurisdictions with lax record keeping and reporting 
requirements. [8]  The structure of the second phase is 
more solid and leaves blurred and distant trail records. 
 
Finally, in the integration phase, the launderers put these 
funds in circulation into a normal economy system through 
legal spending on luxury goods, contracting on service, 
investment on real estate or financial assets, and even 
lending in the form of legitimate money.  The module for 
classic money laundering is depicted in the Figure 1.   
 
In the Figure 1, money launderers tend to seek for foreign 
countries or territories where there is ineffective counter 
money laundering law and return illicit funds to original 
individual at ultimate destination.  During the initial 
laundering, in the country where illicit funds generated, it is 
seen that banking systems are mostly used to transfer funds 
[9] that are often processed through underlying activities 
with directly depositing cash into bank accounts or 
smuggling cash to laxly regulated jurisdictions where money 
launderers base their operations.   When the launderers 
move the illicit funds into a less anti-money laundering 
control area, they may choose an offshore bank offering 
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Figure 1 The Selected Typical Module for Classic Money Laundering  
 
 
             
         
             
  
 
             
      
Placement 
Module 1: 
Structure large cash into smaller amounts, and then 
deposit into bank account in origin country. 
Module 2: 
Smuggle illicit cash to a foreign country. 
Module 3: 
Move funds to a foreign country through electronic 
fund transfer or by purchasing bank drafts 
Layering 
Module 1: 
Then, withdraw cash and fly to a foreign country. 
Module 2: 
Then, wire the funds to the third country with less 
anti-money control.     
Module 3: 
Then move the funds to complex disguised business 
organizations and obtain legitimate appearance 
through accomplice such as practitioners 
l Finally, invest in business venture such as 
restaurant, game company and hotel, or 
purchase luxury automobiles, or make 
payments by means of maintaining corporate 
real estate. Enjoying a luxury travel, etc.  
l Use back-to-back loan and then transfer the 
funds to business organizations and invest on 
real estate. 
l Loan repayment 
Integration 
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adequate financial infrastructures and transit bank accounts 
through withdrawing cash [10] or wiring at various locations.  
At the stage of layering, this process can be done without 
leaving traces of sources and transfer the seemingly 
legitimate funds to final destinations: laundering paradise or 
origin country.  To enjoy illegal profits safely is the 
purpose of money laundering.  At the stage of integration, 
the launderers will purchase luxury items, financial 
valuables, sell real estate or place investments on private 
businesses to control main sectors of normal economy.  In 
addition to those, the launderers might finance a front 
company by lending technique to conceal illicit funds and 
then enjoy tax deduction from interest payment.   
 
The classic module described here should not be regarded as 
the only optimal techniques of money laundering.  As 
anti-money laundering law reinforced and international fight 
against money laundering more emphasized, the tendency to 
use website based transaction to avoid detection gains a 
loyal following. 
 
MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME ON THE 
INTERNET 
 
As stated in this paper, convenience and anonymity are 
attractiveness to the launderers.  Internet access has these 
features.  The probability of using the Internet as a 
laundering channel might be high since the Internet has 
grown dramatically from its inception in the late 1970s to 
today’s truly global medium. [11]  Through the Internet, the 
launderers take advantage of quickly transacting the illicit 
funds without extra supporting technology.  Simultaneously, 
a variety of secure electronic payment systems [12] were 
being developed to protect confidentiality and authentication. 
[13]  Although these improvements on security and privacy 
can be considered as positive contributions to efficient 
customer transaction and cost reduction for financial 
systems, they also make financial institutions more difficult 
to examine the launderers’ identification and give an 
appealing opportunity to them.  Consequently, cashless 
payment and remote laundering through the Internet will 
come to be the new type of detergent that allows for 
cleaning dirty money. 
 
Eventually, the idea of money laundering electronically is 
not a new one.  A typical example of cashless payment is 
electronic fund transfer (EFT) [14] that has been mostly 
used to possess a nearly risk free conduit for moving money 
between countries.  This illicit fund transfer with limited 
information regarding the party involved [15] can be easily 
hidden because of large wire transactions occurring daily in 
the United States, [16] for example.  More explicitly, the 
Table 1 shows non-cash payments that may be preferred by 
the launderers.  
 
Basically, the launderers will employ electronic cashless 
payments as illustrated when conducting money laundering 
through the Internet.  Following the continuous growth of 
on-line banking facilities, [17] the launderers can easily 
open bank account with fake registered identity on any ISP 
(Internet Service Provider) located in a remote area and 
structure the illicit funds into different difficult-to-trace 
layers without physical presence.  When lastly enter into 
integration, the launderers legitimize the illegal profits by 
diversifying the payment method into non-cash instruments 
and by trading goods and services on line.  The Table 2 
indicates selected items mostly purchased on line and 
probably used by the launderers to make the illicit funds 
appear legally. 
 
Specifically, credit card is the most popular payment method 
for cyberspace shopping today.  An example of 
Internet-based laundering by means of credit card payment 
is shown in the Figure 2.  In this example, the launderers 
would establish an offshore website company that provides 
service through the computer network.  The launderers then 
hire couriers under their control to utilize this Internet 
service charging on credit card or debit card tied to bank 
account which has the illicit funds deposited.  After the 
service rendered, this offshore website company invoices
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Table 1 Technology-Based Payment Attraction to Money Laundering 
 
Payment Instrument       Medium       Status 
 
Credit Card         POS (Point of Sale)     On-Line 
          EDC (Electronic Data Capture)   On-Line 
          Imprinter       Off-Line 
ATM card/ Check Card        Auto Teller Machine     On-Line 
Stored Value Card (Smart card)     POS        Off-Line 
Paper Check        ACH / VAN      On-Line 
EFT          CHIPS       On-Line 
Digital Cash [18]                On-Line 
 
 
 
Table 2 Items Purchase On Line (Number of Respondents: 645) [19] 
  
Order   Item     Percentage of Responses   Count of Responses  
 
11    Banking     12.1%       78 
12    Investment     11.8%       76 
16    Autos     4.3%        28 
18    Insurance     2.5%        16 
20    Real Estate     2.0%        13 
21    Jewelry     1.6%        10 
    Total       34.3%      221 
 
* The rest of items are omitted to show in this Table due to low unit price that the launderers might not select to consume their large sum of 
illicit money. However, it does not mean the launderers would not choose them at all. 
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acquirer bank or the credit card company to claim the 
payment by capturing process.  Then, acquirer bank or the 
credit card company bills the launderers’ bank account 
through the Internet.  Therefore, the launderers can 
legitimize their criminal proceeds by simply controlling 
bank account and offshore website comp any Internet 
service. 
 
The electronic credit card system on the Internet has a 
feature that each entity such as ISP, IIS (Internet Invoice 
Service), CA (Certificate Authority), and payment gateway 
including the launderer’s bank, acquirer bank or the credit  
card company can only see the partial information because 
of secure transaction protocol. [20]  Thus, it makes 
transactions more difficult to trace. 
 
Another example of Internet-based laundering would be the 
use of Ecash.  Ecash was developed by DigiCash [21] that 
is a Holland and the United States based company to allow 
fully anonymous secure electronic cash to be used on the 
Internet.  The security is improved by extensive use of both 
symmetric and asymmetric (digital blind signature 
techniques) cryptography required for open computer 
network.  Ecash worth real monetary value has been 
available on the Internet since October 1995. [22] Hence, 
Ecash may become a particular interest to money launderers 
and law enforcement authorities because of its 
unconditionally untraceable trait.  
 
In the Ecash laundering module, firstly the launderers have 
to structure the illicit funds within reporting limits into 
several traditional bank accounts under different names in 
different financial institutions.  This stage of process can be 
operated repeatedly for a certain period of time as long as 
required.  In the mean time, the launderers register Ecash 
account with Internet bank and gain a cyber wallet  [23] 
residing on their computer.  Secondly the launderers 
transfer their illicit funds from each traditional bank account 
and deposit them into Ecash account through on line 
banking service.  The launderers’ computer as long as 
properly connected to the Internet can do all of this process.  
Once the illicit funds have been transferred to Ecash account, 
the cyber wallet would convert them into digital money 
(called E-coin) legitimately and make them become 
untraceable and anonymous virtually. [24]  In the 
integration phase, the launderers locating in any country or 
jurisdiction are able to access to digital funds from any 
unknown ISP in any country or jurisdiction by using Telnet. 
[25]  And then, the launderers either spend E-coin on real 
or personal property on line or have their Ecash account 
actually call the bank to transfer the funds to origin currency 
account or to the third country, thus concealing their true 
identity. [26]  The Figure 3 shows the Internet-based 
laundering by means of Ecash.  In the Figure 3, Ecash 
withdrawing protocol allows the launderers’ privacy to 
conduct Internet transactions.  Therefore, the Internet bank 
that holds digital money and merchant that accepts E-coin 
have difficulty to identify the launderers.  This would leave 
a longer trail for law enforcement agencies to follow.  
Though the use of E-coin to purchase luxury item is 
currently not very popular on the Internet, the temptation for 
retailers  [27] and money launderers seems growing as it is 
uneasy to trace who spent E-coin in the Internet. 
 
ISSUES ON THE INTERNET-BASED LAUNDERING 
 
The characteristics [28] of the Internet technology appear to 
aggravate classic money laundering risk.  Several concerns 
are raised and covered by aspects of regulation, private right, 
technology and bank supervision. 
 
Lack of Uniform Regulation 
 
Transactions performed by access to financial services 
through the Internet have revealed money laundering risk.  
However, the law that regulates the Internet banking and the 
new electronic payment technology is vague.  For example, 
in the United States, the purpose of the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986 [29] is to avoid the launderers’ structure 
cash transaction with domestic banks.  Under that law, the 
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Figure 2 Internet-Based Laundering by Credit Card Payment 
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The launderer’s website 
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by credit card or debit card  
Acquirer bank or credit 
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Request payment by 
credit card number, IP 
number, date and time 
Credit card and debit card 
linked with bank account 
that contains illicit funds 
Check payable to the 
launderer’s company  
Internet billing to the 
launderer’s account 
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 Figure 3 Internet-Based Laundering by Ecash 
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financial institutions are obliged to file CTR and report 
suspicion. [30] Nevertheless, Ecash account offered on the 
Internet bank is not FDIC insured. [31]  The non-FDIC 
insured Internet bank probably would not have mandatory 
compliance with the law. [32]  Furthermore, E-coin issuer 
may not be necessary a bank. [33]  Thus, the law would be 
inadequate to regulate non-bank organizations.  In Taiwan, 
the Act of 1997 only regulates conventional laundering and 
currently has no related initiative in anti-money laundering 
through the Internet.   
 
Privacy Issues 
 
The privacy is a controversy while using lawful 
investigation into a suspicious violation of anti-money 
laundering regulation.  The new electronic payment method 
with security protocol prevents individual’s financial records 
from exposing to the open computer network.  Before 
being convicted of money laundering, a question will be 
raised on that should an individual’s financial privacy be 
protected when the law enforcement agency conducts 
investigation.   
 
Taiwan law enforcement agency recently proposed to 
establish a Criminal Proceeds Flow Control Database that 
links with the host computer in every financial institution 
island wide.  In that system, all customers’ financial 
records would be revealed to the investigation authority.  
This initiative has generated a privacy debate in Legislative 
Yuan.   
 
In Australia, an example of electronic payment method such 
as stored value card is also a concern about the control on 
collection and use of transaction and other data.  The 
information may be valuable to the law enforcement agency.  
However, privacy right will be violated when disclose the 
information related to any particular use of the card where 
that particular use try to identify the card user. [34]  
Consequently, a balance between Privacy Act [35] and 
anti-money laundering law should be considered. 
 Difficulty in Identification and Authentication  
 
KYC (Know Your Customer) policy [36] is implemented to 
prevent traditional money laundering at the placement stage.  
However, in the example of Internet banking, the risk is 
increasing because of reduction of personalized contact 
between the customer and the financial institution.  In other 
words, through the Internet, the financial institution has 
difficulty to identify whether the bank account is opened on 
his own behalf.  Moreover, KYC may not be sufficient to 
authenticate the identity of the customer at the initial stage.  
The launderers would take that advantage to conceal their 
true identity on the Internet.  Specifically, the Internet 
banking makes KYC more difficult to identify whom 
actually uses bank account and from which location the 
account is accessed because of the fictitious identity and the 
mobile ISP worldwide. 
 
One scenario showing difficulty in identification and 
authentication is that the launderers could enter an Internet 
bank through a distant ISP located in a country where has 
high bank secrecy and requires little documents for account 
opening in the name of someone else under control, and then 
process transactions through personal computer.  
 
Another similar on line scenario is the use of ATM 
(Automatic Teller Machine) and phone banking services.  
They only need little information for identity verification 
and then conduct fund transfer without any direct physical 
interaction.  Taiwan recently had an example indicating 
that phone banking service was used to transfer illicit funds 
generated from fraud activities under the cover of false loan 
service company. [37] 
 
Low Transparency of Transaction 
 
Secure cryptographic protocols ensure anonymous and 
untraceable records.  It means that the audit trials would be 
unclear to trace suspicious transactions that occur during the 
sales process.  In the example of the nature of Ecash, the 
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law enforcement agency could be hindered to detect Ecash 
transactions in between initial subscription and final 
settlement during merchant’s capturing process.  As a result, 
it is unable to trace back the origin of illegal funds.  A 
warning scenario is that money laundering indication for the 
Ecash would not be easy to establish, and thus the Internet 
bank and e-retailer may not fulfill reporting obligation if 
there is a substantial quantity of Ecash trading in the near 
future.   
  
The laundering risk for the smart card, another case of Ecash 
application off line, varies based on operation characteristics: 
open and closed-end system. [38]  The open-end smart card 
system such as Mondex [39] could have higher risk because 
of allowing direct person-to-person value transaction 
without an intermediate bank involved.   In that respect, 
the audit trial on transaction is insufficient.  A possible 
scenario is that the launderers may use AVM (Automatic 
Vending Machine) or ATM to transfer illicit funds by means 
of purchasing the smart card and exchanging value 
anonymously. 
Rapid Growth of Technology for Organized Crime 
It is reasonably assumed that international organised crime 
may have solid resources to develop advanced technology in 
order to break encryption codes for the smart card.  Thus, a 
scenario is that the launderers may crack the smart card’s 
chip and modify the amount of money stored on it.  
Consequently, the launderers could change the upper limit 
for the smart card value and circulate the funds in the form 
of electronic bits without passing through any regulated 
banking system.  
 
The Issues of Jurisdictional Problem 
 
Recently, FATF remains a concern on determining 
jurisdiction for the licensing and supervision of financial 
services provided on the Internet.  Within their own 
countries, the banking supervisors cannot ensure financial 
services from the out side country servers comply with 
anti-money laundering procedures.  The other issue arises 
in how to locate the place of the Internet transaction in order 
to decide which country or jurisdiction has the authority to 
investigate money laundering.  A scenario would be that 
the launderers might scatter their on-line transactions 
through various ISPs across different countries or 
jurisdictions, thus make trails longer to trace and circumvent 
the investigation because of confusion of the location that 
transactions taken place. [40]  
Web-Based Service Set Up by Organized Crime 
The launderers could layer their illicit funds under the cover 
of bogus or real information service provider and create an 
electronic payment channel for those funds.  A scenario is 
that under the guise of e-merchant, the launderers may take 
virtual order and provide service by collecting the illicit 
funds as payments through a seamless and labyrinthine 
network of the Internet banking service.   
 
Given that scenario, Internet gambling [41] seems an ideal 
Internet-based service to be a cover for the launderers.  In 
the case of the Internet gambling, all transactions can be 
performed by providing credit card information under 
fictional betting scheme.  The server of this virtual casino 
could be maintained and located offshore in a lax 
anti-money laundering jurisdiction, thus make the law 
enforcement agency difficult to prosecute the relevant 
parties and collect transaction records.  
 
Inability to Track the Internet Links 
 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) allows data convey 
through the Internet by breaking down information into 
packets.  Once the packets are created, IP (Internet Protocol) 
[42] provides each packet with address information and 
direct it to the next destination on its travel between 
computer servers.  Consequently, Each transmission from a 
particular server should leave records on those servers with 
which it communicates.  However, if a control log file 
(cookie) is not set up for a transmitted message and the IP 
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address is not fixed for the user, then it may be difficult to 
determine the ultimate link between the launderers. 
 
A scenario is that the launderers may take advantage of the 
dial up connection that provides IP address on a temporarily 
basis by ISP.  The launderers have the IP number while 
connected to the Internet.  Once they completed illegal 
transactions and exited this connection, the IP number is 
assigned to the next active user.  Thus, a specific launderer 
is difficult to determine. 
 
Lack of Human Intervention Against Money Laundering 
on the Internet 
 
Financial institutions have a responsibility under the 
anti-money laundering law, to be aware of the possibility 
that illegal activities may have occurred.  Conventionally, 
bank employees through over-the-counter transactions can 
detect possible indications of money laundering activity.  
And they have an obligation to file suspicious report to the 
management for scrutiny.  However, the lack of 
face-to-face interaction results in the difficulty of collecting 
conclusive evidence to determine whether it is money 
laundering by human judgment. [43]  Thus, money 
laundering risk in the placement stage on the Internet is 
increasing with less human intervention. 
 
An example of the Internet banking service recently 
launched by local banks in Taiwan shows the deficiency of 
anti-money laundering procedure that can be implemented 
on line.  Despite limited function of financial services [44] 
at initial stage, it would be an alternative for the launderers 
to structure illicit funds repeatedly for a certain period of 
time under current limitation.  The critical issue will be that 
no human activity could monitor the frequency and trend of 
transaction on real time mode, [45] thus the launderers may 
have sufficient time to layer transactions before they are 
found. 
 
Another example is that writing computer money laundering 
detecting program for the Internet transactions.  However, 
the launderers may figure out what criteria that are being 
judged by and as soon as change their laundering methods to 
avoid tracking.  As a result, even when all computer 
procedures are obeyed, human beings are still better 
watchers when laundering is in process.  
 
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST 
INTERNET-BASED LAUNDERING 
 
Effectively, in order to prevent the Internet launderers, the 
key issue would be how to ascertain indication for possible 
money laundering activities on line, and then file suspicious 
transaction report or maintain financial records for law 
enforcement agency.  Ideally, it seems computer program 
can perform this job.  Nevertheless, as mentioned already, 
the launderers may learn existing rules applied and make a 
seemingly legal transaction pattern so as to evade attention 
from the computer program.  Then the launderers would 
further take advantage of the Internet to sophisticate fund 
transfer routes and reduce the transparency of financial 
records.  In view of that, how to examine and control the 
working procedure while building initial account 
relationship with the customers would be a determinant that 
alleviates the risk of Internet banking laundering.   
 
Framework of Countermeasures Against Internet-Based 
Laundering 
 
The Figure 4 illustrates the foundermental framework for 
counter Internet based laundering.  The framework consists 
of ascertain, control, and back-end operation support. 
 
Firstly in the stage of ascertain, KYC policy would be 
implemented by relevant business entities that provide 
Internet financial services as shown in the Figure 4.  
Conventionally, face-to-face customer identification, as a 
minimum, is a baseline anti-money laundering measure 
when the account is established.  However, practically, 
because of market competition, depersonalized on-line 
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account opening would be rendered to meet customer’s 
convenience.  In that respect, in order to reduce laundering 
risk while open account through the Internet, financial 
institutions in different countries have countermeasures 
listed in the Table 3, for example.  
 
Table 3 indicates at first stage when building on-line 
business relationship with the bank, the KYC is tried to 
conduct as it does in traditional way.  However, the 
effectiveness of such measure is still limited to whether 
front-line employee can acutely detect indications of money 
laundering and whether particular attention would be paid to 
those high-risk exceptional accounts. [46] 
 
Despite the human judgment that may be cautiously 
exercised while establishing account, the difficulty of 
authenticating true ownership of bank account cannot be 
completely removed because of the characteristic of remote 
access to the account and thus conduct of transactions on 
behalf of true owner through the Internet.  As a result, to 
more effectively safeguard the vulnerability of financial 
transactions in the Internet environment, recommended 
principles of potential solutions that may reinforce current 
countermeasures be outlined in the Table 4.  It is seen that 
the human judgment is a crucial factor for either traditional 
face-to-face or on-line account open when conduct money 
laundering prevention.  However, in the middle of the 
transaction process, automated collection of objective 
information or at least in relation to certain rudimentary 
possible laundering indicators may be necessarily 
constructed, and assist either financial institution or law 
enforcement agency to timely and effectively trace 
suspicious transactions.  The feasibility of biological 
verification on the account holder may be useful for the 
financial institution to verify the identity so as to discourage 
the launderers. 
 
In the second stage of control, by limiting the range of 
on-line financial services and the amount of transaction, it 
may decrease the possible convenience of using financial 
institutions as an intermedia ry for money laundering.  The 
availability of Internet service only limited to those accounts 
established in traditional way may reduce the variety of 
payment channel selected by the launderers.  In case that 
financial institutions may establish website located in 
relaxed banking regulation region and then provide on-line 
financial service not allowed in home country, the firewall to 
block the access to such website may be constructed by 
regulating ISP as well as the log file to store IP number and 
telephone number for each user should be maintained for the 
law enforcement agency.  Consequently, it can improve the 
ability to trace the Internet link. 
 
In the back-end support stage, a compatible computer-based 
report in gathering and supplying significant financial 
transaction records and cross boarder wire transfer 
information should be readily useable by screening system 
for all relevant anti-money laundering parties.  And all 
relevant intelligence covered by means of ISP through the 
Internet should be maintained for a reasonable period of 
time.  An early-warning team is suggested to set up for 
every financial institution.  The function of this team would 
review computer-based suspicious report and then make a 
tracking phone call to the account owner while dis covering 
abnormal transaction patterns.  The criteria for such 
scrutiny will be determined by the factors of amount, 
frequency, and purpose of transaction that would be 
regulated by law based on practical situation.      
 
Possible Solutions for Smart Card 
 
As for countermeasures against money laundering through 
smart card, it appears to be in need of uniform standard of 
fully accounted system for all various stored value cards to 
avoid peer-to-peer transactions (only limited to person to 
merchant or person to financial institution transactions).  A 
central database is recommended to build up for all 
transactions and thus makes it easier to reconstruct card 
balance and transaction history for the law enforcement 
agency to trace.  To constrain the capacity of smart card 
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Figure 4 Framework of Counter Internet Based Laundering 
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Table 3 Current Countermeasures for On-Line Account Open by Selected Countries 
 
Country   Measure  
Belgium Per anti-money laundering law, it makes no distinction between traditional and on-line account opening by 
fax, e-mail or Internet.  A copy of probationary document must be filed and maintained by the entity.  
Japan Only accept on-line transaction of which account is opened through traditional face-to-face channel. 
Taiwan On-line transaction is currently limited to bank account that is already opened through over-the-counter 
procedure.  No relevant law regulates on-line account open procedure.  
United States On-line account open procedure is similar to that by mail.  The customer must enter identification number 
for verification. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Basic Principles for Potential Countermeasure  
 
Principle   
        
By KYC procedure: 
l Strengthen existing customer identification requirement and revise procedures that can facilitate the expertise of 
financial institutions to truly know transaction pattern and financial behavior of nominal account holder over the life of 
business relationship. 
 + Advantage 
² By human scrutiny, as early as possible to detect abnormal pattern and conduct proper reaction. 
² By periodical telephone contact and physical site visit on the customer, more or less, reduce the risk that the 
launderers take advantage of not necessary presence in the bank over the life of account, and then transacting 
illicit funds distantly.  
 + Disadvantage 
² Need experienced employee.   
² Staff turnover and discontinuity of detecting money laundering training would influence the effectiveness of 
anti-money laundering measure.   
² In respect to customer relationship management, the capacity per FTE (Full Time Employee) could be limited due 
to the concern on cost effective.  
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Table 4 Basic Principles for Potential Countermeasure (Con’d) 
 
Principle   
 
By technical improvement: 
l Develop advanced information technology that can detect suspicious on-line transaction.   
 + Advantage 
² Reduce bias from subjective human judgment. 
² Reinforce accuracy of information by co-work with human-based monitoring 
² Timely generate automated suspect report on daily, weekly or monthly basis 
² Create explicit format for sorting, and then locate potential launderers as effectively as possible. 
 + Disadvantage 
² Need compatible computer report format that links to each relevant party.  
² Need continuously revise money laundering criteria for computer program 
² Need construct firewall to prevent the launderers from cracking the computer program 
 
l Develop a new verification technology that may scan customer’s physical characteristics such as eyeball, fingerprint and 
even DNA. 
+Advantage 
² Easily identify and authenticate true ownership of bank account 
² Increase the difficulty of disguising identity, and then discourage the launderers. 
+ Disadvantage 
² Financial institutions and relevant parties may need sufficient database to store biological information.  And the 
information exchange network that links with Bank, ISP, merchant, or even law enforcement agency is necessary to 
establish to cross verify the identity of true owner. 
² Financially, cost effective would remain a concern  
 
By transaction limitation: 
l To limit the type of on-line financial service or the amount of transaction 
 + Advantage 
² Reduce the alternative that the launderers may select 
² Prolong the length of time that the launderers structure their illicit funds, thus probably discourage them. 
+ Disadvantage 
² Due to market competition, all financial institutions may not have uniform standard for the limitation of such 
financial services and transactions.  Therefore, the launderers still could have selections to register in on-line 
banking that has relaxed limitation. 
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including maximum value stored and turnover limits as 
well as number of smart cards per individual customer is 
suggested while issuing. [47]  Linking this new payment 
technology to bank accounts is also feasible to provide 
clear audit trials while using smart card on-line or off-line 
mode.  Certainly, there would be a possible difficulty to 
establish international standard to such countermeasures 
and then require uniform record keeping procedures for 
systems to enable the examination, documentation, and 
seizure of relevant records by investigation authorities. 
 
Jurisdictional Issues 
 
In this regard, in order to achieve agreement on which 
country or jurisdiction would have authority to control 
anti-money laundering and conduct investigation, a recent 
joint Bank of France and French Banking Commission 
report proposes to use a rule that the Internet transaction 
should be considered to have taken place in the computer 
that covers the financial service provider’s information and 
management system.  However, if ISP hosting provider’s 
website is not in the same location as its management 
system where the account held, then the latter could be 
considered as the relevant location. [48] 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In comparison with classic money laundering technique, 
electronic money laundering scheme takes advantages of 
remote access, quick fund transfer and highly secured 
transaction in the Internet.  Despite the absence of data 
showing the magnitude of the Internet-based laundering, 
we must accept that we currently traversing a period of 
transition to electronic means of money laundering.   The 
examples given in this  article are only typical modules that 
the launderers may use.  From the examples illustrated, 
they tell us the efficiency of electronic payment method and 
the application of security protocol in the Internet are 
abused by the launderers to legitimize criminal proceeds.  
However, the current anti-money laundering law is not 
sufficient to cover money laundering in the Internet.  The 
Internet-based laundering has been alerting the law 
enforcement agency.  It is assumed that the law 
enforcement agency would think of ways to surpass the 
advances of the Internet-based laundering so as to catch 
money launderers in the act.  Nevertheless, in a free 
market, it is inevitable that the Internet technology will be 
improving quickly and the launderers would use that 
Internet technology.  As a result, prohibiting Internet 
transaction on the grounds that such transactions are 
difficult to trace is not basically feasible.  Thus, it is 
summarized that: 
 
1. From the point of view of the law enforcement agency, 
they worry that the Internet may become the launderers’ 
paradise.  In that respect, the law enforcement agency 
wishes to have access to all financial records.  The 
private right would be violated under that expectation.  
Despite no fully financial privacy right that can be 
protected while using so-called legitimate law 
enforcement inquiry into suspicious account, should 
anonymous on-line transactions or all individual banking 
data be secretly monitored?  Such question would be a 
debate between legal authority, banking supervisor and 
relevant private right protection party.   
 
2. In the era of the Internet environment, in addition to 
traditional financial institution, ISP has become an 
important medium for the launderers.  As for the 
responsibility of ISP, the current telecommunication law 
is inadequate to include their obligation to provide 
reliable user information.  This results in that the 
appropriate regulation on ISP is in need.  The 
legislative authority can opt to put more pressure on ISP 
as it does on the banking industry.  In that regard, it 
may invoke serious attention from ISP to make 
electronic money laundering cumbersome. 
 
3. From the point of view of the financial institutions, 
obviously, most honest citizens are the target groups that 
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the financial institutions will deal with.  The financial 
institutions would be continuously seeking for advances 
in product developing and financial service upgrade.  To 
provide customers’ quick response on banking services at 
any time and any place is heavily relying on remote 
banking by means of the Internet technology.  As a 
result of compliance with anti-money regulation, they 
would be convinced to implement special investigatory 
software into their computer systems so as to flag 
suspicious on-line transactions.  The financial 
institutions probably would establish early warning 
teams to timely monitor automated suspicious reports, 
thus detect money laundering indicators as reference to 
the probable cause to search by the law enforcement 
agency.  And in order to reduce the potential risk of 
using temporary account by the launderers, the bank is 
practical to refuse accepting incomplete documented 
account by restricting delegation authority in the 
frontline.  The extent of the implication of face-to-face 
account open procedure will be varied from country to 
country.  However, there would be a tendency to 
conduct account open on-line under certain limitations or 
at least as it does in traditional means.  Bank employee 
training on verification and authentication would be 
reinforced while business relationship established in the 
Internet.  Consequently, more or less, the loopholes are 
to be avoided so that the financial institutions may 
alleviate the possibility of being limitless conduits for the 
launderers to move money between countries. 
 
4. Many issues will be experienced before the entire 
anti-money laundering system settles down to cover this 
revolutionary mode of money laundering.  In view of 
those mentioned issues and to find out feasible solutions, 
a wide range of disciplines including regulation 
establishment, private right protection, jurisdictional 
conflict, technical improvement and human judgment are 
currently seeking for well-organised national and 
international co-operation among legislative authority, 
law enforcement agency, bank supervision, interior and 
exterior affair, and ISP.  The counter Internet-based 
laundering seems still be in the difficulty of covering all 
mentioned issues.  Despite those issues and 
disadvantages for the possible countermeasures, the 
authorities would never stop trying to crack down the 
criminals.  They would try every possible effort to 
hinder money laundering activities.  Many multi-ways 
of possible solutions to prevent money laundering need 
to be reviewed and reinforced periodically since the 
technology behind the new electronic payment system is 
still developing. However before well-thought 
countermeasures fully developed, at least, the anti-money 
laundering law should be amended to cover 
Internet-based laundering, and thus comply all relevant 
parties in the economy system.  
 
5. If the launderers can take advantage of the Internet 
technology to legitimate the illicit funds, same way may 
be used in the anti-money laundering measures.  
Specifically, the combined application of 
technology-based and human-based scrutiny may be 
feasible and effective to prevent money laundering.  
However, which part that is more focusing would be 
varied from case to case. 
 
6. Revision on the law to cover money laundering in the 
Internet environment is a foundermental work to develop 
uniform law and international standard to combat 
Internet-based laundering.  And no matter how much 
better improved is anti-money laundering measure; KYC 
policy is always a very baseline work when building 
on-line business relationship with customers. 
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